Zoning--Constitutional Validity of Ordinance Proscribing Service Stations: Burden of Proof Shifted to Municipality-Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Board by Wachtel, Edward W.
ZONING-CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE PROSCRIBING SER-
VICE STATIONS: BURDEN OF PROOF SHIFTED TO MUNICIPALITY-
Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Board (PA. CMWLTH
1971).
I. BEAVER GASOLINE Co. V. ZONING HEARING BOARDI'
Seeking to obtain a permit to build a service station, Beaver Gaso-
line Company was refused by the Zoning Hearing Board in accord-
ance with an ordinance which ".. . specifically prohibits gasoline
service stations in 'C' Commercial Districts .... -2 within the Bor-
ough of Osborne. A significant and crucial finding indicated that
" . . . gasoline service stations [were] either expressly or impliedly
prohibited from all other use districts in the borough."3
On appeal from a ruling that Beaver had not met its burden of
overcoming the presumptive constitutional validity of the ordi-
nance, the appellate court set precedent by reversing, and deter-
mined that the public servants rather than the applicant bore the
burden of presenting evidence concerning the validity of the ordi-
nance.
4
The lack of a consistent direction in zoning decisions has been rec-
ognized by the Pennsylvania courts.5 The emerging rationale ap-
pears fraught with unconventional complexities 6 and in conflict
1. 275 A.2d 702 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 703.
4. The rule is fundamental and the case law is voluminous. The prin-
ciple is one from which there is no dissent in any jurisdiction. "The statute
here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of police
power.... [T]he presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute."
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1930).
5. The difficulty involved is pointed out in Exton Quarries, Inc. v.
Zoning Bd. of Adj., 425 Pa. 43,-, 228 A.2d 169, 182 (1967), upon which the
Beaver court relies. "This case is very important and is exceptionally
difficult because the law in the field of zoning-commencing with Bilbar
Construction Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adj., 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d
851 (1958)-is in such confusion that no one knows with any certainty what
it is in many of the zoning situations which arise."
6. See Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary
Suburban Zoning: From Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of Change, 16 Vn.L.
L. REv. 507 (1971) for an extensive and well-reasoned examination of cur-
rent zoning developments in Pennsylvania. The true difficulty in ferret-
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with other lines of judicial thought.7 The reasoning applied in
Beaver, since it rejects traditional presumptions of validity, is of ex-
treme value in gauging future developments in zoning law. In-
deed, it appears that the zoning arena is becoming the forum for an
inevitable clash between individual civil rights and collective en-
vironmental rights.8
Reasoning itself to the point of finding the prohibition "inher-
ently discriminatory", 9 the court relied on three definite factors:
(1) the totality of the exclusion; (2) the legitimacy of the business;
and (3) the requisite relationship to police powers.
In addition to a city being able to zone comprehensively the land
within its boundaries, it may prohibit certain types of businesses
within those boundaries.10 Within such boundaries a presupposi-
tion of districting is normally warranted. Consequently, the power
to forbid a use traditionally extends to a particular district with
an allowance or permission of that use in another district assumed.1
With Beaver Gasoline Company lacking an alternative site to con-
duct its business within the municipality, the presumption of va-
lidity became suspect and required a cautious reappraisal by the
court.
12
The Beaver court recognized that "... the statute was intended
to prohibit an illegitimate business,"'18 but it relied on Pennsylvania
case law to find gasoline stations are capable of being legitimate
businesses.' 4 The operation of a station in a legitimate and safe
ing out a cogent state of the law is evident in light of the instant case.
The analysis therein submitted that the case law of Pennsylvania was not
indicating a shift in the burden of proof.
7. The two lines of approach have been characterized as "... the Penn-
sylvania rationale and the sensible rationale." Williams & Norman, Exclu-
sionary Land Use Control: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22
SYRACUSE L. REv. 475, 498 (1971).
8. It is submitted here that the confusion arising in Pennsylvania
stems not from a novel approach to an old problem but from an early
recognition and attempt to deal with the problems of population expan-
sion and its consequential urban sprawl vis A vis a perhaps antiquated
system of land use control.
9. 275 A.2d at 706.
10. 8 E. McQun.L , THE LAw OF MUNCIPAL CORPOrTIONS § 25.119b
(3rd ed. 1965 rev.).
11. Id.
12. ". . . [T]he constitutionality of total prohibitions of legitimate busi-
nesses cannot be premised on the fundamental reasonableness of allocating
to each type of activity a particular location in the community .... [and]
should be regarded with particular circumspection." Exton Quarries, Inc.
v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 425 Pa. 43, -, 228 A.2d 169, 179 (1967).
13. 275 A.2d at 704.
14. See Sun Oil Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 403 Pa. 409, 169 A.2d 294
(1961); Appeal of Shell Oil Co., 18 Ches. Co. Rep. 270 (1970).
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manner, with a minimal potential for injury, the court found, is
dependent upon its ability to function under regulation.15 The reg-
ulation of gasoline stations in the past has proven to be an effective
means of eliminating the attendant undesirable effects. A total pro-
hibition, therefore, does not afford the opportunity to operate in a
manner which has been consistently found acceptable.
Besides rejecting the naked presumption of constitutional valid-
ity, the court took issue with the lower court finding that traffic
control and congestion established a basis for a relationship to the
police powers. 16 The Beaver court rejected this justification and
determined that the relationship presented was not found ". . . to
be of such [a] magnitude so as to justify prohibition of the general
use.,'17
With the question finally turning to why the prohibited use
should be justified to any degree or magnitude by the municipality,
the court integrated legitimacy and total prohibition via Exton Quar-
ries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj.' 8 to overthrow any previous pre-
sumption of validity. The language used in Exton exhibited the
specificity with which Beaver could premise its disregard for the
presumption of validity. "[A] zoning ordinance which totally ex-
cludes a particular business from an entire municipality must bear
a more substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals
and general welfare than an ordinance which merely confines that
business to a certain area in the municipality."' 9 Relying upon the
necessity of a "more substantial relationship", Beaver accordingly
lowers the burden incumbent upon the property owner.20  With
the burdened lightened, 21 the court relies upon the capacity of the
station to operate in a legitimate manner, through the potential of
regulation, to "... lead to the inescapable conclusion that the bur-
15. Id.
16. Although the court "... cannot speculate that [the] traffic conges-
tion will be any greater as a result of a gasoline station operation. . .", it
would not be rash to assume that the very business of servicing vehicles
implies a demand for increased traffic. 275 A.2d at 706.
17. Id. at 704 (emphasis in original).
18. 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
19. Id. at -, 228 A.2d at 179 (emphasis added).
20. This regard for the property owner's interest and its unusual weight
consistently applied in Pennsylvania casts doubt upon its applicability
in other jurisdictions. See Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning,
79 YALE L.J. 896, 923 & n.113 (1970).
21. Ours Appeal, 61 Mun. L. Rep. 80, 85 (1969).
den of bringing forward its reason for the prohibition is shifted to
the municipality."
22
The concurring opinion appears to be better reasoned and less
extreme than the majority in its hesitance to disregard the long es-
tablished presumption. Attempting to reconcile an apparent con-
tradiction between the presumptive doctrine and the ability of
courts to declare a law unconstitutional on its face, the concurring
opinion would avoid reaching the presumptive stage of its reason-
ing.23 Relying upon the experience of judges and their general
knowledge of life, the concurring opinion summarily finds that there
is no possible relationship between the prohibited conduct and the
protection of society. The burden is not shifted. The burden is
sustained by the citizen with the aid of the general knowledge of the
judges.2 4 The soundness of this method of disposition may be well
founded, but its application to a use which requires regulation is
questionable.
The dissenting opinion, if viewed under the supposition that a mu-
nicipal legislative body acts in allegiance to the interests of its elec-
torate, appears to emerge with the most palatable view. It would
maintain the presumptive validity doctrine, finding the court in-
capable of viewing the specific circumstances with an empathetic
eye as were the local legislators.25 The dissent finds the majority
capable of only a remote point of view. It also feels that the ma-
jority position puts too much emphasis on what it subjectively feels
to be a legitimate business without fully considering, or allowing
Osborne Borough the opportunity to establish 26 the peculiar charac-
teristics of the locale and the limitations afforded by the real es-
tate.
II. EXCLUSIONARY ZoNNG--FACTORS AN DEVELOPMENT
The factors giving rise to municipal efforts to exclude uses and,
in general, to deny residential and commercial access would appear
to be in response to the heavy flow of middle and upper-income
families from central metropolitan areas into the suburbs.
21
22. 275 A.2d at 706.
23. Id. at 707.
24. Id.
25. "I urge... that this court should be loathe to replace the firsthand
knowledge of local officials with its [own] remote point of reference." Id.
at 713.
26. It seems reasonable to have remanded the case for further ex-
planation of the reasons for a total prohibition since Osborne Borough did
not know it had the burden of going forward. This disposition was es-
poused by Mr. Justice Kramer in his concurring opinion. Id. at 710.
27. U.S. CoMiMISSiON ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
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Threatened by urban sprawl and a degradation of the general wel-
fare as it exists in the less crowded municipalities, 28 the local legis-
lators exercise such exclusionary zoning practices as large lot zon-
ing; minimum house size requirements; extraordinarily high sub-
division requirements; and exclusion of certain uses such as apart-
ment buildings, mobile homes, parks, service stations, outdoor ad-
vertising, private schools, mortuaries, cemeteries, and various com-
mercial and industrial uses.
29
Three distinct interests are valued in determining the fundamen-
tal reasonableness of exclusionary provisions. The classical con-
flict involves the property owner charging an unreasonable and
arbitrary use of police power.30 Presently emerging in Pennsyl-
vania are the interests of non-resident outsiders demanding equal
protection in the form of equal access to the community.81 Con-
trary to the property owners due process position and the outsiders
equal protection arguments are the rural residents' desire to live
away from the annoyances of the big city. Seeking to maintain
this aspect of the general welfare, the municipality claims a valid
use of police power through exclusionary practices.
This preference for rural life with its encompassing demands
8 2
has run a second best in Pennsylvania to the rights of the property
owner and the "general public interest833 of the state. Simply, it
appears that some people prefer to live in denser areas while others
prefer to live in rural areas. Therefore, low density zoning is estab-
CITY, H.R. Doc. 91-34, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESs. 7 (1969). [Hereinafter cited
as the DOUGLAS .REPORT].
28. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently noted that: "One of
the basic social ills of today is that we have too many people living too
close together". Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 37, 1 E.R. 1669 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 907 (1971).
29. DOUGLAs REPoRT at 211-17.
30. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.365 (1926).
31. In Pennsylvania this factor was implicitly recognized in National
Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). The
subject has also been considered in various recent articles. See, e.g.,
Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Large Lot Zoning, 79 YALE L.J.
1418 (1969); Note, The Constitutionlity of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896
(1970).
32. Service Station prohibitions are only symptomatic. Open-space with
its aesthetic and psychic amenities and population control appear to be the
goals.
33. See note 40 infra.
lished to provide for the welfare of people who seek the rural way
of life. Low density zoning, regardless of the manner with which it
is accomplished, minimizes traffic hazards, dust and air pollution,
noise and other disagreeable facets of high density living.84
The developments in Pennsylvania indicate that communities
must deal with the problems of population growth and may not re-
fuse to confront the future by adopting zoning measures to restrict
population to present levels.35 If a municipality is successful in
limiting its population growth through the use of exclusive zoning
regulations, it forces those who would normally live there to find
an alternative place of residence.36 Thus, the argument follows, the
local legislators should not be vested with that degree of power
which can burden adjacent communities and then clothe its denial
of future expansion as being reasonable. 3 But such a vesting of
power is the foundation of civil government and provides for the
elasticity inherent in the maxim-salis populi suprema lex est.18
It should be the people of the community, through their appropri-
ate legislative body, and not the courts, who govern its growth and
its life. Within the elasticity of police power lies the ability and
duty of legislators to find, because of changed living conditions,
that an improper use of police power is now a recognized legitimate
use of that power.39 It should naturally follow, then, that the cir-
cumstances of a specific community may dictate that it finds a uni-
versally accepted use repugnant as it applies to its welfare. If this
is so, the duty of the courts should remain consistent and all intend-
ments should still be in favor of the community action.
By recognizing the right of access to the community by outsiders,
or by reasoning that an exclusionary provision puts an undue bur-
den on adjacent communities, the Pennsylvania courts, in essence,
34. See Rubi v. 49"er County Club Estates, Inc., 7 Ariz. App. 408, 440
P.2d 44 (1968), where an ordinance forbidding town houses on land sur-
rounding a golf course was upheld as constitutional.
35. "The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way
of the natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto un-
developed areas in search of a comfortable place to live. We have con-
cluded not." National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, -, 215
A.2d 597, 612 (1965), invalidating four acre zoning as it applied to the
defendant township.
36. See generally, Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d
765 (1970).
37. National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1970). Recognized also was the impact of zoning determinations upon
community non-residents.
38. 16 Am. JuR. 2d § 268 (the welfare of the people is the highest
law).
39. See Miller v. Bd. of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925),
appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927).
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are giving effect to the caveat expressed in the leading case in zon-
ing:
It is not meant by this, [finding the relationship sufficient], to
exclude the possibility of cases where the general public interests
would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way.40
In opposition to taking cognizance of the "general public interest" is
the concept that police power is coextensive with the necessities
of the case and each exercise is presumed to be in reference to the
peculiar situation and the needs of the community.41 It is to this
point that the dissenting opinion in Beaver arrives. Likewise, it is
this point with which the courts will have to contend as the use of
exclusionary zoning practices increase.
Ill. CALiFoRaiA AND ExcLusIoNARY ZONING
Intensity of land use is a well-recognized and valid city concern
and relates to both health and welfare factors and to proper zoning
practice. Statutory recognition of this concern in California is
found in Government Code section 65850, sub-division (c) which pro-
vides that the legislative body of any county or city by ordinance
may regulate the intensity of land use.
42
Whether exclusionary zoning practices are a reasonable means of
attaining a desired land use ratio, and consequently, a means of lim-
iting population growth, appears dubious in most instances in Cali-
fornia. Although the validity of zoning for total exclusion does not
appear to have been directly decided in California, the available
case law, though meager, gives ample litigative weaponry for ei-
ther proponent. Small rural communities which are primarily res-
idential and which have refrained from districting would appear to
be most advantageously situated to withstand constitutional attacks
upon the use of such provisions.
Snow v. Garden Grove43 exhibits language sufficient to warrant
exclusionary considerations:
40. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
41. New Mexico ex rel. McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 203 U.S.
38 (1906).
42. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850 (West 1966).
43. 188 Cal. App. 2d 496, 10 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1961). A conditional use
permit to use property as a storage yard for moved houses was denied.
Uses equally obnoxious as the storage yard were permitted because they
had been specifically permitted in the original provisions.
It is therefore well established that a city of the size and limited
area of Garden Grove is not obligated to make provision for the lo-
cation and operation within its city limits of any and all known
industries regardless of other considerations .... 44
The factual situation in Snow did not pertain to a direct and total
prohibition. However, all uses not specifically permitted were ex-
cluded subject to the granting of a variance. This appears impor-
tant since the land was therefore capable of some form of non-resi-
dential use.45 Rather than standing for exclusionary zoning, Snow
might well stand for limited exclusion contingent upon the provid-
ing of some form of alternative non-residential use.
Closely analagous to a total prohibition is the situation presented
in In Re White.46 There the municipality undertook to zone the
town into two districts. One district was devoted to residential uses
and the other to business uses. The important finding, to the detri-
ment of the dictum in Snow, 47 was that the business district created
was too small and already in complete use. The White court main-
tained that if the local legislators find a business district necessary
then it must reasonably follow that such a district provide for fu-
ture business development. The court found that the creation of
just two districts was ". . . in effect a legislative finding that the
maintenance of both districts was necessary to the public wel-
fare. ' 48 Thus any growth in the form of new businesses was
thwarted and was therefore unreasonable.
The White case seems to stand for the proposition that if the
community feels it necessary to have a business district then it must
be adequate and not favorably limited to the business enterprises al-
ready established. Arguably and in accord with Snow, it follows
that had the community trustees, in their wisdom, excluded all
businesses, the court could not have relied upon the favored position
created for existing businesses and conceivably could have found
such an exclusionary ordinance valid.
Los Angeles v. Gage49 follows the concept that where a business
is excluded there must be available an alternative area for its lo-
cation within the municipality. The court found that although de-
fendants' property had been zoned five years previously for plumb-
44. Id. at 502, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84. A question as to whether it is
"well established" arises in an analysis of the case law used by the court
as its means of support.
45. Although the use in question was excluded from the remainder of
the city, the land in question was not unusable to the applicant.
46. 195 Cal. 516, 234 P. 396 (1925).
47. See note 44 supra.
48. 195 Cal. at 520, 234 P. at 397.
49. 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
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ing, it was not unreasonable to compel the discontinuance of that
use. "The ordinance does not prevent the operation of defendants'
business; it merely restricts its location. Discontinuance of the non-
conforming use requires only that Gage move his plumbing busi-
ness to property that is zoned for it.""o The acceptability of a total
prohibition may well rest to a certain degree on whether or not the
local legislators read the needs of the community to require more
than one district. That is, if the community appears to have been
districted in any manner, then such districting may be a sufficient
justification for finding any blanket prohibition to be improper.
Whereas the courts in Pennsylvania appear to be taking note of
non-resident interests and pressures exerted upon neighboring com-
munities,51 California courts have not directly relied upon such in-
terests in their determinations. Reynolds v. Barrett52 alludes to
the fact that the city in question, Piedmont, was entirely sur-
rounded by a larger city, Oakland, which was capable of providing
all the necessary services to Piedmont.53 In view of the fact that
the local legislators of Piedmont had made determined efforts to
keep their city residential, the court found that the city need not
provide a larger area for business purposes.54 If the court con-
siders it proper to assume that a neighboring community will ab-
sorb the increased demands created by a solely residential com-
munity, then it may follow that the neighboring community will
absorb additional population factors which the small community
seeks to exclude. Such a view seems tenuous, but the courts may
in the future determine the reasonableness of an exclusionary pro-
vision by determining the willingness or unwillingness of the neigh-
boring communities to absorb the excluded burden.
EDWARD W. WACHTEL
50. Id. at 461, 274 P.2d at 44.
51. See note 37 supra.
52. 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 29 (1938).
53. Id. at 249, 83 P.2d at 32.
54. The court held that although the ordinance limiting the business
district as a whole was not unreasonable, the applicant's property was
within and completely surrounded by the business district and as such,
his property was an "island" with such an application clearly being dis-
criminatory. Id. at 251, 83 P.2d at 33.
